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INTRODUCTION
This article traces the history of the fiscal “stability” features of
the Eurozone, following the European Union’s movement from a firm
‘no bailout’ policy, through the eventual financial rescue of several
troubled Eurozone member states during the Euro crisis,1 and then on
to the 2012 establishment of the European Stability Mechanism
(“ESM”).2
It will also describe the parallel history of the European Union’s
Stability and Growth Pact (“SGP”), 3 from its origins in the
* Professor of Law and Jacob Becker Fellow, Loyola Law School – Los Angeles. Kevin
Favro and Elisheva Rafael provided valued research assistance.
1. For an overview of the Euro crisis, see generally Philip R. Lane, The European
Sovereign Debt Crisis, 26(3) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 49 (2012).
2. The European Stability Mechanism, established in 2012 in the aftermath of the Euro
crisis, is a permanent facility for financial assistance to Eurozone members.
3. For an overview of the history of the Stability and Growth Pact through its 2005
reforms, as well as an argument that economic growth concerns should be given more
primacy, see generally Roger J. Goebel, Economic Governance in the European Union:
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convergence criteria stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty4 in the run-up
to the launch of the Euro, to the first generation of the SGP through
its breakdown and subsequent 2005 reforms, and onto the post-crisis
Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance (“Fiscal
Compact”).5
These two lines of development represent the European Union’s
fiscal stability apparatus. The SGP, as reformed and enhanced by the
Fiscal Compact, continues to address fiscal stability in ordinary times,
which includes both the times of economic expansion and the periods
of contraction that are experienced through the business cycle. The
SGP system operates both ex ante, in reviewing member state
proposed budgets, and ex post, where it creates the possibility of the
imposition of sanctions on member states that persistently run
excessive budgetary deficits.
The European Stability Mechanism has been set up to address a
return of member state fiscal catastrophe. The ESM will serve to
bailout an imperiled Eurozone member state, notwithstanding the
continued presence of a ‘no bailout’ provision in the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).6 An intergovernmental
treaty among the Eurozone member states formally established the
ESM.7 Participation by the Eurozone member states in this treaty, in
turn, was authorized by an amendment to the TFEU8 that had been
Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth in the Stability and Growth Pact?, 31
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1266 (2008) [hereinafter Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh
Economic Growth].
4. See Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C. 191/1
[hereinafter Maastricht TEU]. The Treaty set out four convergence criteria for member states
to qualify to adopt the Euro: low inflation rate, low long-term interest rates, stable exchange
rates, and avoidance of excessive budget deficits. See generally Roger J. Goebel, European
Economic and Monetary Union: Will the EMU Ever Fly?, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249 (1998).
5. See generally See European Commission Press Release D/12/2, Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, Feb. 1, 2012,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-12-2_en.htm [hereinafter Treaty on Stability,
Coordination, and Governance].
6. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 125, 2012 O.J. C. 326/47 [hereinafter TFEU]. The provision provides that neither the EU
nor any member state “shall be liable for or assume the commitments of . . . any member state
. . . .”
7. See generally Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Feb. 2, 2012,
Eur. Comm’n DOC/12/3.
8. See id. at art. 136(3). TFEU Article 136(3) now provides: “The Member States
whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable
to safeguard the stability of the eruo area as a whole. The granting of any required financial
assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.”
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adopted through the ‘simplified revision procedure.’ 9 The ESM is
intended to act as a “firewall” for the Eurozone.
The establishment of the ESM in the aftermath of the Euro crisis
represents the delayed recognition that a Eurozone member state may
indeed fail - and that the common interest of the Eurozone (if not that
of the entire European Union) may justify financial intervention.
Effectively, the ESM is a vehicle for a bailout. Like many “crisis”
facilities, 10 the ESM may never be called on. The ESM’s presence
may simply serve to calm financial markets. Still, recent experience
has demonstrated that easy access to Euro borrowings might tempt
Eurozone member states into fiscal irresponsibility and trap them into
economic straits from which they could not emerge on their own
power, thereby threatening the entire Eurozone project.
The very presence of the ESM, even should it never be drawn
on, admits the possibility of a future bailout. Maintaining the ESM in
the meantime is costly, though to a varying degree beneficial to
certain member states – if for no other reason than driving down their
Euro-denominated borrowing costs. The ESM more than mutualizes
sovereign default risk; it effects a present transfer from certain states
to others. It is, functionally, an element of fiscal policy at the intra-EU
level.
This brief history of the ESM will be, in design, a backward
look, as essentially most histories are. The story will end, for the
moment, with the 2012 establishment of the ESM and the lingering
workout of the Euro crisis that had been ignited by the 2009 postelection revelations of the massive understatement of Greece’s
budgetary shortfalls.11 It will proceed chronologically, beginning with
the stipulation of the convergence criteria that had to be satisfied
before a member state could be admitted to Stage III of the Economic
and Monetary Union (“EMU”) called for by the Treaty of
Maastricht. 12 Maastricht addressed the ‘deficit bias’ that had been
observable in several EU member states embarking on the Euro
launch; it imposed a convergence criterion for annual budget deficits
9 . See id. at Part III. The “simplified revision procedure” is made available for
amendments to Part Three of the TFEU.
10. For a discussion of ‘crisis containment’ international financial law, see generally
Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2009).
11. See Tayyab Mahmud, Is it Greek or déjà vu all over again?: Neoliberalism and
Winners and Losers of International Debt Crises, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 629, 639 (2010-11).
12. See supra note 4.
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of a maximum of 3% of GDP. Overall national indebtedness was to
be reduced so as to approach 60% of GDP as a condition for
admission to the Euro.
The Maastricht convergence criteria were given a kind of
permanency in the first Stability and Growth Pact adopted in 1997.13
The 3% annual budget deficit and 60% overall debt targets were
carried over from the Maastricht convergence test. 14 Eurozone
member states were subjected to fairly rigid budgetary constraints on
a continuing basis. Such strong fiscal discipline, given the retention of
fiscal competence by the Eurozone member states, was thought to be
necessary to enhance the credibility of the single monetary policy.15
The initial Stability and Growth Pact proved unworkable16 and
provoked a political (and constitutional) crisis;17 it was reformed in
2005.18 A relatively stable few years followed,19 before Europe was
drawn into the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. But it was the
October 2009 Greek revelation that suddenly brought the risk of a
Eurozone member state sovereign default to the forefront of the
13. The Council adopted two regulations in June 1997 in order to implement the SGP:
the Multilateral Surveillance Regulation and the Excessive Debt Regulation. See Roger
Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra note 3 at 1269. See also
Council Regulation No. 1466/97, O.J. C 236/1 (Aug. 2, 1997); Council Regulation No.
1467/97, O.J. C 236/3 (Aug. 2, 1997).
14. There was no stipulation of the targets for aggregate budget deficits or aggregate
sovereign debt. As these are likely less volatile than the constituent national statistics, and as
they cannot be directly controlled, there may be little technical advantage that these be
established.
15. See Marco Buti & Bertrand Martinot, Open Issues on the Implementation of the
Stability and Growth Pact, 174 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 92 (2000) (“The SGP is probably the
most stringent ‘commitment technology’ ever adopted by a group of governments in an
attempt to establish and maintain sound public finances.”)
16. Economic conditions in Europe began to decline in 2002, and unemployment grew
to over 10%. See Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra note 3, at
1319-20.
17. Both France and Germany were projected to run budget deficits exceeding the 3
percent SGP limits in 2003. See Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth,
supra note 3, at 1320-1323. The Commission had recommended the initiation of sanctions, but
France and Germany were able to wield political support in the Council to block the process.
The Commission sued the Council, seeking to annul its decision not to adopt the
recommendations of the Commission. See Commission v. Council, Case C-27/04, [2004]
E.C.R. I-6649. See generally Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth,
supra note 3, at 1329-1340.
18. See R. Morris, H. Ongena and L. Schuknecht, The Reform and Implementation of
the Stability and Growth Pact, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 47, June
2006.
19. See generally Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra
note 3, at 1318-1319.
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awareness of the financial markets.20 This jangling of the nerves of
the financial markets played out on top of an already challenged
economic picture in many Eurozone member states, as bust seemed to
have replaced boom for the long haul.
The very real confrontation with the prospect of a sovereign
default within the Eurozone demonstrated that the prophylactic
approach relying on the budgetary limits set out in both the initial and
reformed Stability and Growth Pacts had failed. The SGP did not
prevent Greece and other Eurozone member states from approaching
the brink of default. Moreover, once the prospect of a Eurozone
member state default arose, there was little to no assurance of a
credible rescue. Working without a net - the ‘no bailout’ principle demonstrated to have generated more collective harm than good.
The various Eurozone bailouts were built on a series of ad hoc
undertakings. They were, so it now seems, adequate to rescue the
afflicted member states. The ESM has now made a Eurozone bailout
facility a permanent feature of the Economic and Monetary Union.
Collective Eurozone intervention in response to a prospective
sovereign default has moved from the unimaginable to the
anticipated.
It has been frequently remarked that the Economic and Monetary
Union is misnamed.21 The EMU does, of course, establish a monetary
union among the participating Eurozone member states – and a
supreme, independent European Central Bank is charged with the
conduct of Eurozone monetary policy.22 But a true economic union
remains far from realization; notwithstanding the considerable
progress achieved toward commercial integration within the European
Union, fiscal policies (taxation, spending, pensions, and the like)
continue to be jealously guarded sovereign prerogatives. Indeed, there
are only minimal efforts at harmonization of these fiscal policies,

20. See Mahmud, supra note 11.
21. Roger Goebel admits the existence of the monetary union, but writes “the so-called
economic union is not really a union.” Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic
Growth, supra note 3, at 1272.
22. Formally, the establishment of the EMU constitutes a transfer of monetary authority
from the Eurozone member states to the ECB. See id. at 1267. It should be remembered that
the adoption of the Euro followed a long period of exchange rate coordination, where
functionally most EU member states ceded monetary control to Germany’s Bundesbank. See
GOEBEL, FOX, BERMANN, ATIK, EMMERT & GERARD, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 4TH (2015) at
1223-1232.
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such as the budgetary and overall debt strictures of the Stability and
Growth Pact.
It is awkward, to put it mildly, to have a common currency
throughout a zone where disparate national macroeconomic policies
are in play. And the simple fact remains that real economic
convergence is a far-off scenario in the Eurozone; there are wild
differences in productivity, employment, and workplace
demographics among the member states. As it seems clear now, the
original EMU design was destined to shake itself apart sooner or later.
The structural disparities among the Eurozone member states are
profound. Greece demonstrated some of the wildest political
expectations, which inflamed German sensibilities. A heady mix of
vast public employment, early retirement ages, and a demonstrable
inability (or unwillingness) to collect taxes as due seemed to make
budget shortfalls inevitable. Were Greece running the drachma, the
result of such profligacy (and I use this term ironically) would have
been domestic inflation and a loss of exchange value. But Greece now
had the Euro as its domestic currency, so these automatic adjustments
did not take place. And while it is true that the Euro is a commonly
shared domestic currency, it is, from the budget perspective of any
particular Eurozone member state, an external currency. The necessity
of budget balance cannot be escaped in the long run, absent default or
other form of, shall we say, external involuntary transfer. Spain,
Ireland, Portugal, Italy - all have significant fiscal structures that
cannot, as a political reality, be easily changed. And having to meet
domestic social obligations with hard Euros is a considerable
hardship.
What then were the designers of the EMU thinking? They
clearly understood that imposing a common currency on a mix of
countries following very different macroeconomic courses was
unstable at best. They may have simply ignored the problem, hoping
(as optimists) that deeper fiscal integration would follow before a
crisis would erupt. Or - more darkly - they may have recognized that
it would take a crisis, an inevitable crisis, to goad the Eurozone into
the deeper fiscal integration they viewed as necessary to complete the
European project. It is hard to imagine that any serious economic (or
political) thinker would have believed the simple-minded, somewhat
arbitrary, and one-sized budgetary and indebtedness undertakings set
out in the Stability and Growth Pact would, by themselves, be
adequate to effectively coordinate Eurozone member state fiscal
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policies in a way that would support a strong and stable Euro without the periodic and continuing need for large compensating
transfer payments from some member states to others.
I. NO BAILOUTS AND THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
It is true, of course, that a ‘no bailout’ principle has been
incorporated into EU law from the Maastricht Treaty. This language
was scrutinized in the CJEU’s 2012 Pringle decision, which
challenged the compatibility of the ESM with EU norms.23 Yet a ‘no
bailout’ obligation cannot be said to have any demonstrable effect
until a crisis comes along to test it. Indeed, the ‘no bailout’ principle
failed to warn off the financial markets from underappreciating the
real possibility of sovereign default, where the terms of Eurodenominated debt largely converged without regard to the marked
difference in credit-worthiness of the various Eurozone member
states.24
To some degree, the declared ‘no bailout’ policy was an EMU
afterthought, a piece of window dressing to allay worst-case concerns.
While Europe had experienced devaluations during its post-World
War II experience, it had not suffered a sovereign default. But the
Euro introduced the possibility of a new kind of sovereign default one involving a country’s official currency, yet a currency the debtor
state does not and cannot control. In typical sovereign default
scenarios, the debtor is unable to service its external debt, expressed
in a harder currency it cannot control. Internal borrowings create less
of an obstacle, as the borrowing state can simply monetize the internal
debt through issuance of additional units of national currency.
For budgetary purposes, the Euro functions as an external
currency for each Eurozone member state. They no longer maintain
the possibility of running the printing press or engaging in a
devaluation. Sooner or later, member state budgets must balance. But
23. See Pringle v. Ireland, Case C-370/12, [2012] ECR I (2012). In Pringle, the CJEU
characterized TFEU Article 125 as “essentially preventive,” whereas the ESM would operate
in “the management of financial crises which, notwithstanding such preventive action as might
have been taken, might nonetheless arise.” Id. ¶59. The Court does not seem to appreciate that
‘no bailout’ is negative action.
24. See Jay Shambaugh, The Euro’s Three Crises, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY, Spring 2012. See also Christian Odendahl, Insight, The Eurozone’s Real Interest
Rate Problem, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM, July 8, 2014, http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/
eurozones-real-interest-rate-problem.
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linked to this hard reality was the new possibility to borrow Euros at
rates comparable to those offered to Germany. The markets, for
whatever reason, were eager to make Euro-denominated loans. Easy
money presented the temptation to finance budget losses that proved
irresistible to several Eurozone member states.
The markets viewed Spain like the Netherlands, Greece like
Germany - at least in terms of the interest rate charged for sovereign
debt. How could the markets be so wrong? It may have been, of
course, that the budgetary divergence among Eurozone member states
did not in and of itself represent any meaningful risk of default given
the bullish launch of the Euro.
Nor were member states unappreciative of the loss of
macroeconomic tools joining the EMU entailed. For this and other
reasons, they clutched to their retained sovereignty in fiscal affairs.
And ultimately, each Eurozone member was left to its own devices.
‘No bailout’ goes hand in hand with the retention of sovereign fiscal
discretion. The EMU formed on the smashing success of the
reunification of Germany - and the substitution of the hard
Deutschmark for its East German counterpart. 25 The German
experience may have led the founders to an underappreciation of new
risks introduced by the EMU experiment.
In all events, the prospect of sovereign default must have seemed
distant at the time of the Euro launch. Certainly, there was little
perceived need for a coordinated response to a Eurozone member
state default. A concern for introducing moral hazard discouraged any
hint of tolerance for the kind of troubles that came to visit the
Eurozone from 2009. The policy of no bailouts is a policy attempting
to contain moral hazard - but there are practical limits to eliminating
moral hazard. So long as there is a collective interest in play, any
single member state is exposed to moral hazard, notwithstanding
solemn declarations (such as TFEU Article 125) to the contrary. For
all intents and purposes the policy approach adopted by the Eurozone
was one of prevention, as opposed to a post-bailout mop up.
The convergence criteria had already been applied to the
prospective Eurozone member states as they approached Stage III.
Their overall indebtedness of prospective Euro adopters was to be
reduced below 60% of GDP and their annual budgets were not to
25. See Peter Bofinger, The German Monetary Unification (GMU): Converting Marks
to D-Marks, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, July/August 1990.
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exceed 3% of GDP. It is important to note that these criteria were
originally convergence criteria, and not (at least in their first
incarnation) intended to serve as ongoing fiscal targets. And the
choice of the 60% and 3% targets were conceded to be arbitrary.26
The fiscal discipline these numerical criteria exerted was given a
permanent, post-convergence role by the Stability and Growth Pact.
It is hard to imagine that a member state that scrupulously
followed the criteria laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact could
ever find itself at risk of default and in need of a bailout. Indeed,
under certain growth assumptions, maintaining budget deficits below
3% would eliminate overall indebtedness in fairly short order, which
might neither be appropriate nor desirable. 27 Yet not all Eurozone
member states proved to be so scrupulous. For complex reasons, it
was the larger member states, including Germany, which appeared to
have the greatest difficulties in applying budgetary discipline.28
II. 2005 STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT REFORMS
The run-up to the launch of the Euro involved no little disregard
for the convergence criteria that had to be met by each prospective
Euro member state.29 Rather than confining the Euro to the strongest
economies - those countries whose political climate and structural
characteristics best fit the sought after ‘hard’ macroeconomic policies
- the Euro was intended to reach the greater part of the European
Union as it then existed30 (the United Kingdom and Denmark were
permitted to opt out,31 and Sweden’s unilateral decision to stay away
from the Euro has never been challenged).32 In the end, all but one of
26. See Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra note 3, at
1279-80 (“[T]he leading Belgian economist Paul de Grawe flatly states that using the 3%
figure as a limit for the budget deficits ‘has no valid scientific basis.’”).
27. See Paul De Grauwe, The Stability and Growth Pact in Need of Reform, (University
of Leuven, Working Paper, 2003).
28. See A very European crisis: The sorry state of Greece’s public finances is a test not
only for the country’s policymakers but also for Europe’s, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 2010.
29. See Paul De Grauwe, The Politics of the Maastricht convergence criteria, in VOX –
CEPR’S POLICY PORTAL, Apr. 15, 2009.
30. See European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, One Currency For
One Europe: The Road to the Euro (2015), http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/
general/pdf/the_road_to_euro_en.pdf.
31. See European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, The Euro: Who Can
Join and When?, (May 15,2015), http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/who_
can_join/index_en.htm.
32. See id.
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the then EU member states seeking to adopt the Euro were deemed to
have met the convergence criteria. Only Greece failed to qualify - and
it too joined the Eurozone merely one year later.33
In fact, the desired convergence, as measured by the 60% of
GDP upper limit on debt and the 3% budget deficit cap, had not been
obtained by several member states. For some, nominal compliance
with the convergence criteria resulted from a combination of
accounting tricks and outright looking away.34
To some degree, achievement of fiscal convergence was
accepted as a matter à faire. After all, the very same targets were
hardwired into the Stability and Growth Pact. So long as the Eurozone
member states were approaching the targets at the time of the Euro
launch, it might not be far-fetched to imagine that they would meet
and maintain the target convergence in short order.
And so the Euro was launched, with the Stability and Growth
Pact functioning as the central mechanism for fiscal coordination. The
early experience was favorable. 35 The Stability and Growth Pact
featured an elaborate compliance mechanism. All EU member states not simply the Eurozone states - were to subject national budgeting to
review by the Commission. 36 Failure to make the targets triggered
intense review and the possibility of Council-approved financial
penalties for non-compliance. 37 It was thought that national
governments would not stray far from the Stability and Growth Pact
targets because - given the prospect of discipline - it would simply be
too expensive to do so.38

33. See Jennifer Rankin, Greece in Europe: A Short History, GUARDIAN, July 3, 2015.
Greece has been a Eurozone member since January 1, 2001. European Commission, Economic
and Financial Affairs, Greece and the Euro (May 4, 2009).
34. See Allan Little, How ‘Magic’ Made Greek Debt Disappear Before it Joined the
Euro, BBC NEWS, Feb. 3, 2012.
35. See Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra note 3 at
1286-89.
36. See European Commission Press Release MEMO/15/6071, European Commission
– Fact Sheet: The EU’s Economic Governance Explained, (Nov. 26, 2015), http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6071_en.htm.
37. See id.
38. In fact, the early perception of favorable operation of the Stability and Growth Pact
may have been due to the happenstance of benign economic times when, for most Eurozone
member states, achieving the targets came easily. In retrospect, there was likely an
underappreciation of the pro-cyclical nature of the system. That is, Eurozone member states
failed to use ‘good times’ to make structural reforms and/or aggressively reduce indebtedness.
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All this broke down dramatically in 2004 as both France and
Germany veered into recession. 39 In both cases, the national
government engaged in deficit spending beyond the margin permitted
by the Stability and Growth Pact. The Commission took action to
sanction France 40 and Germany 41 - but France and Germany used
their seats on the Council to block the imposition of the enforcement
phase of the Stability and Growth Pact.42
The Commission brought the Council before the Court of Justice
for its failure to act.43 In a “Solomonic” judgment,44 the Court upheld
the inherently discretionary role the Council exercised under the
Stability and Growth Pact (and thus acquitted the Council for its
actions in this instance). The Court did, however, suggest that there
might be situations where a failure to act by the Council might be
actionable.45
As a political matter, the Stability and Growth Pact was a dead
letter. If it failed to check Germany - a state with a long-standing
tradition of hard currency policy - in times of economic stress, it was
hard to imagine that it could be fairly applied to any other member
State. In the words of Commission President Prodi, the Stability and
Growth Pact was “stupid.” 46 The position of the affected member
states was that the budget criterion - the 3% deficit cap - was too
inflexible.47
39. See Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra note 3, at
1289.
40 . The Commission recommended on October 21, 2003 that the Council should
sanction France for its failure to take effective action to reduce its deficits. See European
Commission, Recommendation for a Council Decision giving notice to France, Oct. 21, 2003.
41. The Commission recommended on November 18, 2003 that the Council should
sanction Greece for its failure to take effective action to reduce its deficits. See European
Commission, Recommendation for a Council Decision giving notice to Germany, Nov. 18,
2003.
42. At its November 25, 2003 meeting, France and Germany blocked Ecofin Council
action that would have endorsed the Commission’s findings. See Goebel, Should Fiscal
Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra note 3, at 1325-29.
43. See id. at 1329-30.
44. According to Roger Goebel, the Court’s judgment was “Solomonic” as it permitted
both the Commission and the Council to claim a victory on certain issues. Id., at 1336.
45. See Commission v. Council (Stability and Growth Pact), Case C-27/04, [2004]
E.C.R. I-6649. See also Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra
note 3, at 1329-40.
46. Elaine Sciolino, An Italian Official’s Blunt Words Set Off Euro-Mayhem, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2002.
47. European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, Policy and surveillance,
The
corrective
arm,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/
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In the aftermath of the CJEU’s decision, the Commission
adopted a conciliatory attitude, proposing a series of reforms to the
Stability and Growth Pact.48 These involved introducing the missing
flexibility by expanding the situations where the budget deficit cap
could be relaxed.49
In 2005, the Stability and Growth Pact was “reformed” through
amendments of the Multilateral Surveillance Regulation and the
Excessive Deficit Regulation. The Stability and Growth Pact as
reformed retained the 3% and 60% targets, however. The European
Union remained committed to fiscal coordination; arguably its resolve
was ever stronger given the newly engineered flexibility. The
statistical capacity of both the national budget offices and the
Commission in conducting oversight was increased.50
It would turn out, however, that the reforms to the SGP and
enhanced oversight of Eurozone member state budgeting were not
sufficient to prevent Greece’s massive understatement of the budget
deficit. Greece smashed through the SGP’s budgetary and
accumulated debt ceilings in such a surprising manner (the surprise of
course a result of the expectation induced by the presence of the
reformed Stability and Growth Pact), that the financial markets were
shaken. And so things proceeded from bad to worse, as Greece saw its
funding costs escalate, its access to borrowing decline, and its real
economy tumble away.
III. GREEK DEBACLE TO EURO CRISIS
The scale of the hidden Greek deficits shocked market and
Eurozone political leaders to the core. 51 More importantly, the
member state established in the public’s mind (particularly in the
German public’s mind) an image of a wasteful, irresponsible Greece,
enjoying the good life managed by favored Euro-borrowings. To
corrective_arm/index_en.htm. See also European Parliament, Debates, Stability and Growth
Pact, Sept. 15, 2004, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+
CRE+20040915+ITEM-006+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
48 . See Amy Filpek & Till Schreiber, The Stability and Growth Pact: Past
Performance and Future Reforms, (College of William and Mary Department of Economics,
Working Paper No. 97, 2010).
49. See id.
50. See Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra note 3, at
1347-50.
51. The revised 2009 Greek budget anticipated a deficit of 12.7% of GDP; the prior
forecast had been 6.0%. See Lane, The European Sovereign Debt Crisis, supra note 1, at 36.
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some degree, there were grounds for this belief that Greece was living
beyond its means. Its pensions, it became known, were extremely
liberal (a public employee could retire to full pension at the age of
sixty-one). 52 And Greece was notoriously derelict in collecting
taxes; 53 in fact, the Greek state may have been complicit in the
widespread tax evasion that pushed its budget deeply into the red.
That said, the root cause of the deficits in Greece and the other
peripheral Eurozone member states may have had systematic causes
beyond the control of their respective governments.54
The budget deficit was run up by one Greek government; its
existence was revealed by the successor government led by George A.
Papandreou. 55 There was, no doubt, some internal political
scorekeeping. But the turn of government did seem to restore at least
some possibility of Greece’s return to fiscal prudence.
From the perspective of Greece’s Eurozone partners, its behavior
was doubly reprehensible: running up the deficit itself, followed by
the deliberate effort of keeping it hidden. But the budget deficit may
have been a thoroughly understandable response to irresistible
internal forces. Greece was engaged in democratic government; in
running up the deficits, the Greek government was responding to
domestic political pressures. It may well have been that the
democratic ‘cost’ of adopting the Euro had been understated. The
subsequent Greek revulsion to the austerity program imposed as a
condition of the Greek bailout suggests that the expectations of the
Greek people of their government may have exceeded what the
Stability and Growth Pact permitted.
Greece, like other Eurozone member states, faced structural
obligations that were resistant to budgetary cuts. Again, Greek public
pensions were quite generous (and tellingly more generous than their
German counterparts).56 Greece also has a heritage of extremely high
52. See Kate Connolly, Greek debt crisis: the view from Germany, GUARDIAN, Feb. 11,
2010.
53. See Adea Guillot, Greece struggles to address its tax evasion problem, GUARDIAN,
Feb. 24, 2015; see also Mike Bird, This is the real reason Greece has a massive tax-evasion
problem, BUSINESS INSIDER, Feb. 25, 2015.
54. According to Lane, the “political narrative of the crisis . . . laid the primary blame
on the fiscal irresponsibility of the peripheral nations, even though the underlying financial and
macroeconomic imbalances were more important factors.” Lane, The European Sovereign
Debt Crisis, supra note 1, at 56.
55. See Mahmud, supra note 11, at 639.
56 . See What makes Germans so very cross about Greece?- Greece’s Generous
Pensions, ECONOMIST, Feb. 23, 2010.
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military expenditure as part of its frontline NATO role during the
Cold War.57 And Greece faced some dismal demographics: an aging
population, high levels of unemployment, and outward migration of
the young and ambitious.58 That Greece was out of compliance was
an open secret for many years - and here the EU oversight (or lack
thereof) might be described as enabling. Turning a blind eye to Greek
noncompliance was important to maintaining the overall perception
that all was well in the Eurozone.
The convergence of interest rates prior to the Greek revelations
suggested that the financial markets viewed all Eurozone member
state obligations as posing substantially the same risk. Interest rate
convergence in itself does not establish that the market had perceived
all Eurozone sovereign debt to have the same level of primary risk;
rather, there seems to have been a widely shared perception that,
notwithstanding the presence of TFEU Article 125 (the ‘no bailout’
provision), the Eurozone would intervene to prevent the occurrence of
any credit event. It was not the existence of the deficits that shocked
the markets upon their revelation, but their magnitude. Things were
bad enough to quickly present the possibility of default - something
that had simply not been imagined.
The ECB59 and the German political leadership,60 by word and
by inaction, quickly educated the financial market that this would not
be the case, and huge gaps developed between the borrowing costs
facing Greece and certain other Eurozone states and the German
benchmark.61
The painfully long period of non-response by EU and Eurozone
officialdom brought two scenarios to the forefront. The first was the
possibility of a sovereign default, which was easy enough to imagine
in the case of Greece. The second was the exit of Greece from the
Eurozone. Presumably this would involve an awkward reintroduction
of the drachma - with the result that Greek sovereign obligations that
57. See Marina Skordeli, The Way Forward: Sixty years from the accession of Greece
and Turkey to NATO, NATO REVIEW MAGAZINE, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/
turkey-greece/greece-turkey-60-years-nato/en/index.htm.
58. See Nikos Konstandaras, Greece’s Dismal Demographics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2013.
59. See Mahmud, supra note 11, at 640 (“The ECB reiterated its no special-treatment
posture and reminded Greece that ‘it ha[d] to catch up on its homework’” (citing Europe
Markets Rise Amid Rumors on Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2010))).
60. See Mahmud, supra note 11, at 642.
61. See id. at 640.
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were originally expressed in Euros would become payable in the
newly re-established, greatly devalued, domestic currency.
It is the second scenario - exit from the Euro - that likely created
the greater amount of contagion. If Greece could leave the Euro, so
could any other Eurozone member state grasping to devalue its Eurodenominated indebtedness. Investors holding Euro-denominated
bonds could imagine them converted to pesetas or Irish pounds or lire
- and that would be a financial horror. In fact, a Greek exit might well
have led to a total collapse of the Euro. The very idea of this ‘created’
shadow national currencies, with shadow interest rates reflecting the
variance in risk.
A mix of contagion (justified or not) and objective economic
weakness plunged other Eurozone member states into crisis. Portugal,
Italy, Ireland, and Spain joined Greece in facing large spikes in
interest rates, a drying up of liquidity, and a resultant fall of their real
economies into crisis.
IV. 2012 GREEK BAILOUT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
EFSF & EFSM
There was a long period between the initial recognition of the
dire straits Greece found itself in and the May 2012 bailout. On the
part of the Eurozone member states - and the larger European Union
as well - the initial response was to hope the Greek problem would go
away. This was not a simple matter of indifference. There was no
ready-made political constituency supporting a bailout. A Greek
bailout would violate the clear ‘no bailout’ principle enshrined in the
Treaty. Article 125 may never have been intended to serve as a real
legal check on member state action, but it did express a political
undertaking that was sold to the European people, especially the
German people who abandoned their revered Deutschmark for the
unknowns of the Euro.
And the Greeks did little to engender sympathy during this
period. Revelations of abuses (of a kind that likely could be found in
many states) drove moralizing responses: the Greeks, it seemed to
right-thinking Germans, deserved to be left to their fates.62

62. At one point, German politicians suggested that Greece might close their budget
deficits by “selling off some of their lovely islands.” Id. at 645.
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The Greeks resisted, both before and after the May 2012 bailout,
the imposition of austerity terms.63 An initial bailout was precluded
when the Greek government unexpectedly scheduled a referendum to
approve its terms, including acceptance of the required
conditionality.64 At no point did Greece appear penitent for its noncompliance with the Stability and Growth Pact. This reciprocal
aversion to addressing the problem further enhanced the perception
that Greece would have to leave the Euro.65 And this increased the
contagion now afflicting other Eurozone member states.
In the end, a “troika” comprising the IMF, the European Union,
and the European Central Bank put together an ad hoc and quite
complex bailout package that Greece was willing to accept. The
bailout included “private sector involvement,” 66 also known as
haircuts, where private investors of Greek obligations would
exchange these for new obligations of much less value. Ironically, a
considerable amount of Greek debt was held by foreign private
creditors;67 any bailout funded in part by Germany would flow into
and out of Greece’s hands to partially satisfy these creditors. The
awareness that any bailout would benefit private debt holders drove
the insistence on the inclusion of severe haircuts in the bailout.
Notwithstanding the haircuts, the bailout did not reduce the overall
indebtedness of Greece, although it did effectively shift the mix of
debt from what had been largely private in character to one in which
most debt would be held by public institutions.68
Moreover, the bailout imposed conditionality on Greek
management of its economy.69 This in turn led to popular resistance in
Greece and elsewhere in the European Union as austerity policies
were applied in response to the Euro crisis. Austerity was viewed as
63. Three people died in May 2010 during violent protests in Athens. See id. at 649.
64 . See Daniel Harari, Briefing Paper 7114, Greek debt crisis: background and
developments in 2015, HOUSE OF COMMONS, Oct. 13, 2015.
65. Chancellor Merkel raised the possibility that Greece might be excluded from the
Eurozone. See Mahmud, supra note 11, at 645.
66. Nouriel Roubini, Greece’s Private Creditors are the Lucky Ones, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f0f0708e-679d-11e1-b6a1-00144feabdc0.html#
axzz46WIvkgbF.
67. See Mahmud, supra note 11, at 651.
68. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EUROZONE CRISIS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS (2012).
69 . See Greece’s Debt Crisis Explained, NY TIMES, (Nov. 9, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/greece-debt-crisiseuro.html?_r=0.
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both antidemocratic and punitive.70 As such, conditionality touched
off a renewed debate about the proper role of the state in providing
needed social services.
The Greek bailout provided a historical demonstration of what
the response of the Eurozone to a financial crisis of one of its member
states would entail. It put to rest the notion that a rigorous ‘no bailout’
policy would be applied in such event. Rather, bailout (and further
bailout) appeared to be the appropriate prescription.
The Greek bailout (and on-going support), as well as the
financial assistance provided to Ireland and Spain, have reduced
concerns of any particular member state leaving the Eurozone. The
once-predicted collapse of the Euro 71 has been postponed. The
markets seem to have swallowed this; once again, interest rates
applied to various Eurozone member states on the sovereign
borrowings have converged.
The ad hoc Greek bailout was followed by the establishment of
two ‘temporary’ facilities to provide assistance to struggling
Eurozone member states: the European Financial Stability Facility
(“EFSF”) 72 and the European Financial Stability Mechanism
(“EFSM”.)73 While both of these facilities have been drawn on, their
establishment was not tied to any particular bailout. Together, they
operated to bolster creditor confidence beyond the specific member
states’ beneficiaries of their financial assistance.
The two facilities were backed by guarantees from the
participating Eurozone member states. 74 They were able to access
70. See Christina Schweiger, Progressive Politics: Permanent Austerity Stranglehold?,
SOCIAL EUROPE, May 29, 2015, https://www.socialeurope.eu/2015/05/progressive-politicspermanent-austerity-stranglehold/.
71. Famously, Paul Krugman, Nobel laureate and columnist of the New York Times,
warned of the collapse of the Euro. See Paul Krugman, Euro Zone Death Trip, NY TIMES,
(Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/opinion/euro-zone-death-trip.html.
72. See
European
Financial
Stability
Facility,
About
EFSF
(2016),
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm.
73. The EFSM was created on June 7, 2010. It was engaged on November 28, 2010 to
provide €85 billion of assistance to Ireland and on May 17, 2011 to provide €78 billion to
Portugal. The EFSM provided €139.9 billion of follow up financial assistance to Greece in
2012. European Stability Mechanism, European Financial Stability Facility & European
Stability Mechanism, May 2014. See also Boris Ryvkin, Saving the Euro: Tensions with
European Treaty Law in the European Union’s Efforts to Protect the Common Currency, 45
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 227 (2012) at 240-45.
74. Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, all recipients of bailout funds, withdrew their
respective guarantees from the EFSM. See European Stability Mechanism, European Financial
Stability Facility & European Stability Mechanism, May 2014.
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funds from the capital markets. While they have been replaced in
some sense by the ‘permanent’ European Stability Mechanism, the
EFSF at least will be with us for a long time, 75 as it services
outstanding loans.
V. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ESM
The EFSF and EFSM served their purposes, providing needed
funding to Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus.76 Moreover,
their very presence assured holders of sovereign obligations issued by
other troubled Eurozone member states. But they were designed to be,
and were limited to, the particular financial crisis that inspired their
creation. They were, frankly, of some constitutional dubiousness,
given the presence of Article 125, the ‘no bailout’ clause, and the
possible impermissible delegation of exclusive EU powers.
The decision was taken to construct a permanent facility, the
European Stability Mechanism, to be built on a fairly firm
constitutional foundation,77 and to increase investor confidence in the
performance of Eurozone member states going forward.
The permanent European Stability Mechanism was established
following the October 28-29, 2010 meeting of the European
Council. 78 The ESM replaced the ad hoc Greek bailout facility, as
well as the temporary (though more general purpose) EFSM and
EFSF. Soon after launch, the ESM provided EU€41.3 billion in
financial assistance to Spain to provide for the recapitalization of the
Spanish banking sector79 and provided EU€4.75 billion in assistance
to Cyprus in 2013.80
Establishing the ESM required an amendment to the TFEU
authorizing the Eurozone member states to enter into a stand-alone

75 . See European Stability Mechanism: Synopsis from the European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/efsm/index_en.htm.
76. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
77 . See generally EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN STABILITY
MECHANISM, (2011), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/art2_mb201107en_pp7184en.pdf.
78. See id.
79. See European Stability Mechanism, Spain (concluded), http://www.esm.europa.eu/
assistance/spain/index.htm.
80. See European Stability Mechanism, Cyprus (concluded), http://www.esm.europa.eu/
assistance/cyprus/.
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treaty. 81 The European Council anticipated resort to the simplified
revision procedure82 in order to add a new provision to TFEU Article
136. Whether use of the revision procedure had been appropriate was
tested in the Pringle case, 83 a challenge brought by an Irish
parliamentarian who opposed the ESM. The CJEU upheld the use of
the simplified procedure, stressing that resorting to the ESM did not
constitute an improper delegation of monetary authority, given that
the ESM would only be activated to safeguard the stability of the
Eurozone as a whole and that financial assistance would be subject to
strict conditionality.84 These two limits - the necessary presence of a
threat to wider Eurozone stability and application of strict
conditionality - are set out in the revised TFEU Article 136.85
The European Stability Mechanism entered into force on July 1,
2013.86 The ESM is directed by a Board of Governors comprising the
finance ministers of the Eurozone member states.87 The President of
the European Central Bank and the EU Commissioner for Economic
and Monetary Affairs have observer status.88 Major decisions of the
ESM - including the grant of financial assistance - are to be taken by
“mutual agreement,” which is defined as unanimity of those member
states voting.89
Both the ECB and the IMF will liaise with the ESM to determine
the existence of a threat to the financial stability of the Eurozone as a

81 .
See ARTICLE 136 TFEU, ESM,
REQUIREMENTS AND PRESENT SITUATION IN

FISCAL STABILITY TREATY – RATIFICATION
MEMBER STATES, EUR. PARL. DOC. (2013),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afco/dv/2013-0612_pe462455-v16_/2013-06-12_pe462455-v16_en.pdf [hereinafter ARTICLE 136 TFEU
RATIFICATION REQUIREMENTS].
82. The simplified revision procedure is provided by Article 48(6) of the Treaty on
European Union. The Council used this procedure to amend TFEU Article 136. See European
Council Decision of March 25, 2011 (2011/199/EU).
83. See Pringle v. Ireland, Case C-370/12 (27 November 2012).
84. The Court held that the ESM did not fall within the exclusive competence of the EU
over monetary policy and that the conferral of tasks on the Commission and the ECB were
compatible with their competencies. Pringle v. Ireland, Case C-370/12 (27 November 2012) at
¶ 95. See generally Jonathan Tomkin, Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual
Gymnastics: The Impact of the Adoption of the ESM Treaty on the State of European
Democracy, 14 GERMAN L. J. 169.
85. See ARTICLE 136 TFEU RATIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 81.
86. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM, (2011),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/art2_mb201107en_pp71-84en.pdf.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
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whole. 90 This mechanism will operate to temper the political
discretion to dismiss what is intended to be a significant check on the
ESM’s bailout capacity - and so should reduce moral hazard
concerns. The ECB and the IMF will likely contribute to the
stipulation of financial adjustment policies needed to satisfy the
conditionality of any assistance to a troubled member state.91
The terms of eventual financial assistance will be tailored to the
situation at hand with regard to loan maturity and whether interest
will be fixed or variable. 92 Pricing will start at 200 basis points,
increasing by an additional 100 basis points for any amounts
outstanding after three years. 93 The pricing is said to be nonconcessionary; that is, sufficiently adverse to discourage any
permanent recourse by a troubled member state.94 The ample margins
are also intended to compensate the risk undertaken by the ultimate
providers of the ESM’s funding.
The ESM will also have the power to intervene in the secondary
market for bonds issued by the troubled Eurozone member state.95
Exercise of this capacity would relieve the ECB from undertaking
similar actions.96
The twin requirements - threat to Eurozone stability and
application of strict conditionality - imply that a Eurozone member
state may find itself in dire straits without meaningful access to ESM
assistance (and by implication, to assistance of any other kind). One
assumes that the Greece scenario would satisfy the threat to the
stability of the Eurozone as a whole test, but one cannot be sure.
Greece is a very small economy, but, as events demonstrated, its
default generated contagion and challenged structural notions about
the solidarity of the Euro compact. Still, an extremely irresponsible
member state (which might fit Greece) floundering in what otherwise
might be healthy times for the Eurozone as a whole might find itself
with no hope of rescue. But perhaps this is precisely the dose of
worst-case consideration that operates to reduce moral hazard.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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The ESM includes EU€700 billion of paid in and callable capital
drawn from the Eurozone member states, which is thought to be
adequate to provide for EU€500 billion of lending capacity. 97 The
ESM is also authorized to raise funds on the capital markets by
issuing its own securities.98 The mix of paid in and callable capital is
designed to operate as a further brake on the offer of financial
assistance; sponsoring Eurozone member states might well hesitate to
approve a bailout if it has the consequence of drawing resources
during a time of general financial stress.99 Of course, this is precisely
the scenario where financial assistance is likely to be needed. It
remains to be seen how the markets will view debt issued by the
ESM. The ESM is a European institution with a distinct legal
personality; as such, its commitments do not involve any commitment
from the Eurozone member states that stand behind it.
The Stability and Growth Pact received a substantial reworking
in the aftermath of the Euro crisis. A new intergovernmental treaty
among participating EU member states, the Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance, known as the Fiscal Compact, was
signed on March 2, 2012, and came into effect for the initial sixteen
member states completing ratification on January 1, 2013.100 Certain
obligations of the Fiscal Compact apply to certain EU member states
outside the Eurozone. Article 3(2) of the Fiscal Compact imposes the
obligation on signatory states to transpose the balanced budget rules
into national legislation within one year of its entry into force.101
CONCLUSION
The Maastricht design for monetary union was bold, if not
reckless. It had not been lost on many political and economic
97. See European Stability Mechanism to be launched, DIE BUNDESREGIERUNG, (Mar.
13, 2012), https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2012/03/2012-03-14-esmgesetze.html.
98 . See CREDIT SUISSE, ESM: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS IN EUROPEAN SSAS –
EXPLORER, FIXED INCOME RESEARCH (2012), https://doc.research-and-analytics.csfb.com/
docView?language=ENG&format=PDF&source=em&document_id=1002045321&serialid=Y
iV93D198UryyTOfk5ytJk5BlEQZtjoMMyHxl6%2fHtqo%3d.
99. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EUROZONE CRISIS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS (Sep. 26, 2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42377.pdf.
100. The Fiscal Compact has now been ratified by all 25 signatory states (all EU
member states but Croatia, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom). See Article 136
TFEU, supra note 81.
101. See Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, supra note 5.
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observers, if not the creators of the European Economic and Monetary
Union, that the design was incomplete. Yes, there would be monetary
union for most EU member states, a new common currency would be
adopted, and monetary policy would be transferred to a central
authority (what has become the European Central Bank). But left
incomplete was any transfer of fiscal sovereignty by any member
state. Taxation and social benefits were (and continue to be) matters
of national determination; the decisions when and how member state
budgets would run into deficits were only loosely coordinated. The
Euro experiment has tested whether a group of countries could
operate a monetary union without fiscal union. There was enough
hope that a felicitous combination of growth and economic
convergence would make the plan work. In retrospect, they and we
should have known better.
The post-Maastricht treaty imposed certain budgetary
expectations: budgets should balance in the medium term and there
would be no bailouts of a member state. In other words, there wasn’t
much structure to inhibit a Greece (or an Ireland or a Portugal) from
getting into the trouble they later encountered.
One wonders: were the EMU designers simply irresponsibly
optimistic (the Naive Theory) or did they engineer a structure they
realized was prone to collapse in the belief that inevitable crisis would
force deeper fiscal integration (the Cynical Theory)?
The first Stability and Growth Pact was an afterthought implemented as the greater number of EU member states approached
Stage III of the monetary union. It provided both ex ante and ex post
controls on Eurozone member states’ budgets. The elaborate vetting
of national budgetary plans by EU institutions, and the attendant
transparency, contributes to budgetary discipline; it cannot, however,
prevent the occurrence of deficits in the event that assumptions are
not realized. The ex post controls stipulated by the First Stability and
Growth Pact broke down: the Council’s reluctance to impose
sanctions on Germany and France, which had excessive deficits
during a period of economic slowdown, led to the effective death of
the First SGP and the follow-on reforms. But it had never been clear
what was gained by imposing a financial penalty on a country that
was already running a budget deficit.
The reformed Stability and Growth Pact created more discretion
to manage economic stress, at least with regard to ex post sanctions,
but it is not clear if this was much of an improvement over the initial
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SGP. In any event, the reformed Stability and Growth Pact did little to
prevent the series of catastrophes that characterized the Euro crisis.
The collapse of Greece, the follow-on contagion to other weakened
member states, the unravelling of the market’s expectation of
Eurozone solidarity, and the property crashes in Ireland, Spain, and
Portugal were more than the monetary union could sustain. A bailout,
of course, is a one-off fiscal transfer; to have a bailout program, either
unstated or institutionalized (as is now the case under the European
Stability Mechanism) is to have at least a residual Eurozone fiscal
policy.
The ESM may still be a stop-gap, in that deeper, formal fiscal
integration may be needed to save the Euro (and perhaps the
European Union). At this writing, it is difficult to see the next steps.
The EU is currently threatened with the impending withdrawal of the
United Kingdom, following the June 2016 Brexit referendum.102 The
UK departure might create conditions for greater fiscal coordination
among the remaining EU membership. Or it might push the European
Union into a broader collapse. The European Union as a single market
was a remarkably stable enterprise; the Eurozone as a monetary union
has been far less so. The Cynical Theory might be right: crisis and
demonstrated dysfunction might create the political conditions, years
after the launch of the Euro, for the fiscal coordination needed to
sustain a common currency.
In any event, the European Stability Mechanism is at work even if it has never been called on to provide financial assistance.
There remains a sizable stock of Eurozone indebtedness owed to the
EFSF; it is still too early to declare the Euro crisis behind us. But now
and going forward, the financial markets can read the presence of the
ESM as some level guarantee for Euro-denominated debt issued by
Eurozone member states. The markets can also rest assured that the
strict ‘no bailout’ policy has been abandoned (although of course
Article 125 remains in the TFEU).
The Euro crisis has exposed the fact that in broad parts of
Europe there is no consensus that budget deficits should not be
tolerated. Indeed, the German antipathy to budget deficits (rooted in
German experience) is not widely shared. Post-crisis austerity
triggered hostile opposition. Many Europeans prefer their familiar
102. See Brian Wheeler & Alex Hunt, Brexit: All you need to know about the UK
leaving the EU, BBC NEWS (July 21, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887.
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safety nets, and will support deficits to keep them in place. Attitudinal
(that is, political) convergence is more difficult to achieve – given the
absence of consensus among national leaders (let alone Commission
technocrats) on the degree of budgetary discipline needed to maintain
the Euro.

